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Defendant Alexander B. Paragas stopped making payments on the loan on or about 10/1/2012, almost two (2) years ago. As such, foreclosure proceedings were commenced against the Property pursuant to the Deed of Trust.

Defendant Alexander B. Paragas failed to cure the deficiency and a Notice of Default was recorded in the Contra Costa County Recorder's Office on 1/29/2012. At that time, Defendant Alexander B. Paragas owed nine thousand eight hundred forty seven dollars (\$9,847). [See Notice of Default as attached to the Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "4"]. Subsequently a Notice of Sale was recorded [See Notice of Sale as attached to the Request for Judicial Notice as Exhibit "5"] and the public auction culminated in the Trustee's Sale on 4/23/2012. [See Trustee Deed Upon Sale as attached to the Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "7"].

After Plaintiff acquired the Property at a Trustee's Sale on 4/23/2012, on 5/4/2012, the Trustee's Deed Upon Sale was recorded in the SAN MATEO County Recorder's Office thereby perfecting Plaintiff Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's interest in the Property. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "7"].

On 5/7/2012, Defendants were served with a 3-Day Written Notice for Possession. The Defendants have continued in unlawful possession of the Property after expiration of the written 3-Day Notice for Possession and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is entitled to a judgment for possession.

The Notice was served according to Code of Civil Procedure section 1162; the Notice was posted in a conspicuous place at the Property and mailed to Defendants and all others in possession. The Notice was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "B" and the Proof of Service was attached to the Complaint as Exhibit "C."

After expiration of the Notice, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendants on 5/16/2012. In response to the Complaint, Defendant filed a motion to consolidate which was later withdrawn, the Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment to be heard on 9/20/2012 and a demand for a jury trial, to be heard on 9/24/2012 after the settlement conference on 9/20/2012.

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#### II. DAMAGES CLAIMED BY PLAINTIFF

In the instant Unlawful Detainer case, the Plaintiff is entitled to costs and the reasonable rental value of the premises for each day the Defendants have remained in possession from the date of expiration of the Notice for possession to their vacating the Property. Code Civ.Proc. §1174(b).

Plaintiff filed this unlawful detainer action to obtain possession of the Property which was foreclosed on as a result of Defendant's failure to cure the default of over \$9,847 as of 10/1/2010.

The Plaintiff is only seekign a judgment for possession only and will waive all money damages if the Defendants vacates the Property. Plaintiff has also incurrend at least six hundred and seventy dollars (\$670.00) in costs specifically related to the filing of this unlawful detainer action but will also waive costs if the Defendants vacate the Propetry.

#### III. AREAS OF CONTENTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES

Defendants' seventeen (17) collective affirmative defenses have no merit. Using what can be characterized as boilerplate affirmative defenses, Defendants' respective Answers jointly assert failure to state a claim, waiver, estoppel, failure to mitigate damages, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, unclean hands, Plaintiff's lack of standing, Plaintiff's lack of title, an invalid notice to vacate, holder in due course, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, non-compliance with civil code sections 2924 et. seq., 2923.5, 2923.6 and Business and Professions Code section 17200, violation of Senate Bill 1137, and the failure to allege that a landlord-tenant relationship exists. Defendant Alexander Paragas also incorrectly claims that Plaintiff has filed this unlawful detainer action in violation of an automatic stay initiated by a Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding filed by Paragas.

The majority of these affirmative defenses are without merit and are not brought in good faith; therefore, Plaintiff will not waste this Court's time addressing them. Others will be discussed below. However, as the Court will see, there are no triable issues of material fact raised by the Defendants. As no viable affirmative defenses have been raised, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation should be granted judgment for possession.

# McCARTHY & HOLTHUS, LLP ATTORNEYS AT LAW 1770FOURMANDENE

#### 1. Plaintiff Complied with Civil Code Section 2924

California Civil Code § 2924 states:

(c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.

The Trustee's Deed Upon Sale contained such a recital. Thus, there is Prima Facie evidence that the Trustee's Sale was validly conducted. DEFENDANT has not introduced any evidence to show that the Foreclosure Sale was improper. A mere contention, with no facts, is not sufficient to prove this affirmative defense. The Trustee's Deed Upon Sale contained such a recital. Recitals in the Trustee's Deed Upon Sale creates a rebuttable presumption that the Trustee complied with all the notification to conduct a lawful foreclosure sale, therefore the burden sifts to the Defendant to prove that the notice requirements of Cal. Civ. Code 2924 et seq were not lawfully complied with. Defendant cannot show provide any proof to the contrary. Thus the presumption has not been rebutted.

Recitals in a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale provide proof of the regularity of the sale, and no further evidence is necessary to establish the title and right to possession of the purchaser. See Sorenson v. Hall (1934) 219 Cal. 389; Beck v. Reinholtz (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 719, 723 (held recitals in a trust deed furnish prima facie evidence of the facts as set forth therein and are sufficient to sustain Plaintiff's burden of proof). This presumption applies between the trustor and a purchaser who is not a bona fide purchaser for value. See Wolfe v. Lipsy (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d at 640.

The only issues of title that this Court may consider are those pertaining to whether the foreclosing trustee complied with Civil Code section 2924 et seq. Because the recitals in the Trustee's Deed Upon Sale creates a presumption that the statutory requirements for a non-judicial foreclosure have been satisfied and such resumption has not been rebutted, possession of the Property should be restored to the Plaintiff. Therefore the Court should find that the recitals

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in the Trustee's Deed Upon Sale are Prima Facie evidence that the Trustee's Sale was validly conducted.

#### There is No Landlord-Tenant Relationship and Plaintiff has not Acted in Violation of Senate Bill 1137

Defendant Arlene Hari's eighth and ninth Affirmative Defenses to the Complaint appear to be premised on the notion that a landlord-tenant relationship exists and accordingly, Section 6 of SB 1137, or the Perata Mortgage Relief Bill, affords her 60-days' notice to vacate the Subject Property in order to protect her as an "innocent tenant". However, SB 1137, codified in Cal. Code Civ. P. section 1161b(b), was written with an express eye on the potential for abuse by former borrowers who intended to stay in the property post-foreclosure with their tenants. This is why the language of the statute is so broadly worded, that "this section shall not apply if any party to the note remains in the property as a tenant, subtenant, or occupant." (Emphasis Added). Whatever language the former borrower used to describe himself, the California Legislature saw fit to curb the potential abuses by denying tenants extra time to vacate if the former borrower remained a fixture at the Property.

Defendant Arlene Hari admits to being in possession with the former borrower, Defendant Alexander Paragas. As a tenant living with the former borrower it is not a bona fide situation and she is only entitled to those protections allotted to her by state law. And state law expressly precludes the possibility that any additional time be given to a tenant when the former borrower remains in possession of the Property. This circumstance is precisely the type anticipated by the drafters of both the State and the Federal laws, and why the laws were written not to protect nonbona fide tenants living with former borrowers.

#### 3. There Was No Automatic Stay in Place When Plaintiff's Unlawful Detainer Action was Filed and No Action Has Been Taken in Violation of Any Automatic Stay

Defendant Alexander Paragas' fiftcenth (15) Affirmative Defense alleges that based on the filing of Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California, Case No. 3:12-bk-31228 on 4/23/2012, there was an automatic stay and that Plaintiff knowingly filed the unlawful detainer action in violation of said automatic stay.

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First and foremost, it must be said that there was no automatic stay when the Plaintiff filed the complaint on 5/16/2012 because contrary to the claims made in Defendant Alexander Paragas' erroneously titled Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 USC section 362(c)(3)(B), Defendant Alexander Paragas had already had three (3) bankruptcies pending and dismissed within the 12 month period prior to the date of filing. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code 11 U.S.C. 362(4)(A)(i), which states in part: "if a single or joint case is filed by or against a debtor who is an individual under this title, and if 2 or more single or joint cases of the debtor were pending within the previous year but were dismissed....the stay under subsection (a) shall not go into effect upon the filing of the later case."

On 5/20/2011, Defendant Alexander Paragas filed a Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California, Case No. 2:11-bk-35261. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "8"]. The case was dismissed on 6/24/2011 for failure to file information and terminated on 9/13/2011. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "9"]. It should be noted that Mr. McCandless represented Defendant Alexander Paragas in this bankruptcy case.

On 7/22/2011, Defendant Alexander Paragas filed a second Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Eastern District of California, Case No. 2:11-bk-37976. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "10"]. This case was dismissed on 8/9/2011 for failure to file information and terminated on 10/18/2011. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "11"]. It should be noted that Mr. McCandless also represented Defendant Alexander Paragas in this second bankruptcy case.

On 10/13/2011, Defendant Alexander Paragas filed a third Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court, Northern District of California, Case No. 3:11-bk-33721. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "12"]. The case was dismissed on 2/7/2012 for failure to make plan payments and terminated on 4/24/2012. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "13"]. It should be noted that Mr. McCandless also represented Defendant Alexander Paragas in this third bankruptcy case.

Despite the fact that Mr. McCandless represented Defendant Alexander Paragas in all 3 prior bankruptcy filings, the Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 USC section

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362(c)(3)(B) filed in Case No. 3:12-bk-31228 only lists the last 2 bankruptcy petitions filed. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "14"]. Incidentally, because there was no automatic stay due to multiple bankruptcy filings within the last 12 months, Debtor erroneously filed a Motion to Extend Automatic Stay when the correct filing would have been a Motion to Impose Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 USC section 362(c)(4)(B).

Had Plaintiff actually been given notice of the pending bankruptcy proceeding or Defendant's motion, Plaintiff would have filed an opposition. However, as per the Creditor Matrix filed with Defendant Alexander Paragas' bankruptcy petition on 4/23/2012, Plaintiff Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation was not listed and therefore was not served notice of the pending bankruptcy proceeding. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "15"].

Furthermore, even if Plaintiff had been notified of the bankruptcy filing on 4/23/2012, the order granting Defendant Alexander Paragas' erroneously titled Motion to Extend the Automatic Stay Pursuant to 11 USC section 362(c)(3)(B) was entered on 6/11/2012. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "16"]. Pursuant to 11 USC section 362(4)(C), a stay imposed under subparagraph (B) shall be effective on the date of the entry of the order allowing the stay to go into effect. Since Plaintiff did not take any action in the unlawful detainer case between 6/11/2012 and 7/10/2012, when the case was dismissed, Plaintiff did not take any action in violation of the stay that did not go into effect until 6/11/2012. [Request for Judicial Notice Exhibit "17"].

### 4. Defendant Must Allege Tender and Have the Present Ability to Tender the Entire Indebtedness to Challenge the Foreclosure Process

Finally, as a condition precedent to challenge the validity of a trustee's sale, the former trustor must pay or tender the payment of all amounts owed on the debt that was secured by the Deed of Trust. As a prerequisite to challenging a foreclosure sale, a borrower must, in good faith and with the ability to pay, make an unconditional tender of the secured debt. Napue v. Gor-Mey West, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal. App. 3d 608, 620-621; Arnolds Management Corp. v. Eischen (1984) 158 Cal. App. 3d 575, 578-580; Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assoc. (1971) 15 Cal. App. 3d 112, 117. A complaint that attacks the validity of a foreclosure sale but does not allege a proper tender fails to state a cause of action. Karlsen, 15 Cal. App. 3d at 117 [judgment on the

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pleadings]; MCA, Inc., 27 Cal. App. 3d at 179 [summary judgment].

In the unlawful detainer case, MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Ent. Corp., the plaintiff purchased real property at a trustee's sale which was held pursuant to the power of sale in a deed of trust. The defendant refused to vacate the premises, and plaintiff filed an unlawful detainer action to recover possession and monetary damages. (1972) 27 Cal. App. 3d 170 at 173-174. The Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judgment for unlawful detainer granted to the purchaser of real property at a trustee's sale against the former trustor. It held that the defendant's attack on plaintiff's title failed to raise a triable issue of fact "because we do not find in the record any offer on the part of [defendant] to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was given as security." Id. at 176. As a result, the defendant was precluded from raising issues as to the validity of the trustee's sale or other objections to the plaintiff's title. Id. at 177.

The Court held that the defendant trustor's assertion of noncompliance with the procedure for the trustee's sale, as set forth in California Civil Code section 2924; et seg did not raise triable issues of fact because the defendant had not tendered the full amount of the debt for which the property was given as security. <u>Id.</u> Specifically, the court held:

> [D]efendant's assertions of plaintiffs non-compliance with CC §2924; did not raise a triable issue 'because we do not find in the record any offer on the part of [defendant] to pay the full amount of the debt for which the property was given as security. Some disposition on the part of [defendant] to do equity by tendering the amount of the debt due is a prerequisite to a demand for judgment canceling the trustee's sale....Plietner, 70 Cal.App.2d 576, 582, and cases cited. See also Shimpones v. Strickney, 219 Cal. 637, 649, Crummer v. Whitehead, 230 Cal. App. 2d at 268-269; Humbolt Savings & Loan Soc. V. March, 136 Cal. 321.

Further, in Crummer v. Whitehead (1964) 230 Cal. App. 2d 264, the Court of Appeal made it clear that in an unlawful detainer action brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1161a, where a defendant is entitled to dispute the validity of the trustee's sale, it is a prerequisite to a trustor's demand for relief and attack on the title that he must have tendered the full amount of the debt due. See also Abdallah 43 Cal. App. 4th at 1109 (debtor must allege tender of the full amount of beneficiary's secured indebtedness in order to maintain any

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cause of action for irregularity in the sale procedure).

Here, Defendants have not alleged readiness, willingness, or the present ability to pay the full debt owing to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation to redeem the Property. Because Defendants have failed to allege the present ability to tender, Defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation's title. For these reasons, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation should be granted judgment for possession.

#### IV. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

The Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for possession as the three (3) elements of an unlawful detainer action after a nonjudicial foreclosure have been met: (1) the property was sold in accordance with California Civil Code section 2924 and title was duly perfected; (2) the requisite notice to vacate to defendant was served as described in California Civil Code of Procedure section 1162; and (3) defendant remains in possession of the property.

The facts establish the elements of an unlawful detainer action and there are no triable issues of material fact. As discussed, Defendants' affirmative defenses fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation is entitled to judgment for possession.

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation respectfully requests this Court award judgment for possession in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants, Alexander B. Paragas and Arlene Hari, and all other occupants pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 415.46, as prayed for in the Complaint.

Dated: September 11, 2012

Respectfully submitted,

McCARTHY & HOLTHUS, LLP

Bv

Gayle E. Jameson, Esq.

Attorney for Plaintiff

Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation,

Its Assignees and/or Successors